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The following essay is adnptedfrom 
uA Visiting Scholar Considers The Law 
and the Humanities," which appeared in 
The Key Reporter of Phi Beta Kappa 
Visiting Scholar The selection here is a I 
in summer 1998 as a partial report of 
the author5 year us a Phi Beta Kappa I 
summary of a lecture the author TXI 
delivered during his travels to eight 
colleges and universities throughout the 
g e t  us begin by considering three 
fragments of works that would be the 
United States. A more complete version object of study in the humanities: a piece 
will appear in From Expectation to 
- BY JAM= BoyD WHITE of Emily DickmsonS famous poem, 
"Because I could not stop for Deathn; the 
Experience: Essays on Law and Legal pair of scales in the well-known painting 
Education, a collection of the authofs 
essays being published this year by the 
University of Michigan Press. 
by Vermeer at the National Gallery in 
Washington, D.C., in which a woman 
stands at a table on whch gold coins are 
scattered, holding those scales pensively in 
her hand; and the location of the door in 
the chapel at Ronchamp by Le Corbusier, 
chuah n&ir tha;l at the west end. With Because I mzd not stop for Death - these I compare a quotation b r n  Bmwn v. It qmy seem at bt none at all: The law 
%odd af Educuth The question is: What He kindly stopped for me - &, &er dl, the bureaucratic ann of a 
cow~tiorts can be drawn among these The Carriage held but just Ourselves - bumtlmac state; it is about consequams 
&oqiitems, or between what we do And Immortality. or results in the reaI world, not abom texts 
when &ve study and respond to the first set But she turns the tables by concludmg: or language or t%rcc world d the I 
of items and what we do when we study 
and respond to the last? 
Let, us start with the first set, trying to 
work out what it is that humanists typically 
do; then we can turn to the activities of the 
law, which at first seem utterly different but 
whlch in the end reveal surprising 
similarities. 
- The first and most important 
f, characteristic of humanistic work is that it 
: j  fcuses on a text or other artifact made by 
- athers, in other cultural circumstances, and 
~ ~ f w a l l ~  in the past. The distinctive concern 
:'a$ the humanist is with the meaning of the 
Wfact we examine - that is, its meaning 
the maker and the original audience, 
i'drtd its meaning to the present viewer and 
&fie audience today kc: Because each of the items with which 
!.we $5. begin is a fragment of something larger, 
,J  
ihe first task is to define the "whole" of 
cpch the item is a part - the whole 
, or painting, or church. But h 
ach leads us to other wholes - the 
e oeuvre of the maker, or the whole 
,,,aporld of poems or paintings or chu~hes  
"at defined the expectations of the maker 
?*d the original audience, indeed the 
R\&hole cultural context against which it is a 
tjxrformance. 
," - Thus, to understand Vermeer we need 
$!to understand somethg of the school of 
;' Dutch-painters who preceded him and 
],:'began to represent, as he did, the informal 
7 'interiors of bourgeois homes and the 
,- ordmary lives of the people who lived 
' there, including the women. 
To understand Dickinson, we need to 
understand something of the sentiment- 
alizing conventions governing 19th century 
American verse, especially women's verse, 
for only then will we see her resisting 
some, using others, to make a verse that is 
extraordinarily her own. In the poem I use, 
for example, the comfortable way "Death 
is represented at the beginning, as a kindly 
gentleman neutralized by his companion 
"Immortality," is consistent with the 
tendencies of her day, but the poem 
reverses these, and ends with great 
blea!mess, converting "Immortality," with 
all of its promise of heaven, into "~terni$" 
something very different indeed. 
Since then - 'tis Centuries - and yet 
Feels shorter than the Day- 
Ifirst surmised the Horses' Heads 
Were toward Eternity - 
Much the same is true of Le Corbusier, 
for h~ church, which seems so odd at first, 
like nothing one has ever seen - on the 
outside like a sculpted haystack, on the 
inside dark and disorienting - turns out, 
as we work our way into it, to have the 
same basic architectural form as other 
churches. Initial strangeness proves familiar 
and illuminating. But neither part of the 
experience, neither the strangeness nor the 
familiarity would be available to one who 
did not know what to expect of the design 
of the church in this culture. 
Humanistic study thus involves 
attunement to the culture and context 
against whch the work in question is a 
performance. Like travel to a dBerent 
country, the experience of this attunement 
changes our own imapt ion,  and we 
return to our own world with different 
eyes. It is, in fact, part of the point of such 
work to expose and thus subject to the 
possibility of criticism some of our own 
unconscious presuppositions and attitudes. 
The meaning of a work of the kind we 
are discussing is thus fundamentally 
experiential in kind: the surprise into 
familiarity that Le Corbusier's church at 
Ronchamp offers, for example, or the 
despair enacted in the shift from 
"Immortality" to "Eternity," or the 
frustration of aslung questions about the 
Venneer painting that it will never answer. 
The experience is never complete; it is not 
the same for everyone; and to work our 
way into it is an activity that changes our 
own mind and imaption.  
To summarize, then, we can say that the 
work of the humanities is about artifacts 
and texts from other cultures and times; 
that it is about their meaning, as fully 
understood as possible; that this meaning 
requires an understanding of the context 
against which the original work is a 
performance; that ths  meaning cannot be 
fully restated, both because of the gap 
between one culture and another and 
because of die gap between different parts 
of the self. 
h p t i o n ;  it is about power, not beauty 
or mrh. It is very often =en as a branch of 
public pollcyV in which legal questions are 
collapsed into questions of social science or 
political preference. More familiar15 
perhaps, law is often seen simply as a set of 
rules, to be obeydd or disobeyed. Of 
course, the law am be imagined, 
sometimes usefrz11y, in each of these ways, 
especially when viewed from the outside. 
But when it is viewed from the inside, by 
someone who lives on its terms, it can be 
seen as a field of life and practice, as a set 
of intellectual and imaginative activities, 
and, as such, far closer to the humanities 
than we normally imagine. 
To take one crucial aspect of their work, 
lawyes, like humanists, are constantly 
concerned with the understandmg and 
interpretation of texts that are made by 
others, in other cultural circumtan:ces, and 
usually in the past; and the lawyers' 
interest is always in what these texts mean, 
or should be said to mean. Consider* for 
example, the passage from B r m  v. Board of 
Education, to which I alluded earlier: 
W e  conclude that in the field of public 
edumtion the doctrine of 'separate but 
equal' has no place. Separate educational 
facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, 
we hold that the p h &  and others 
s ~ l y  situated for whom the actions 
have been brought are, by reasons of the 
segregation complained of, deprived of the 
equal protection of the laws gumteed by 
the Fourteenth Amendment." 
Like the examples given earlier, this is a 
fragment of a larger text, and the lawyerb 
first task is to locate it in the larger whole 
of which it is a part. In tlus case, the 
meaning of the phrase "in the field of 
education" raises serious questions: Does 
the Court mean to limit its holding to 
public education, permitting segegation in 
restroom, parks, and swimming pools, for 
example? Or is the educational aspect of 
thLs case really an accident? Or is there 
some other explanation for this hguage? 
Such questions will carry us both to the 
rest of the opinion and beyond it, to its 
larger context. 
In law as in the humanities, the relevant 
''whole" thus expands to include not 
merely the single work of whch a passage 
is a part, but the range of contexts against 
whlch it is a performance, here including 
earlier cases relied on as authority for 
segregation by race, like the infamous 
PZessy v. Ferguson; cases that cut the other 
way like Sweat v. Painter, which insisted 
that "equality" meant full educational 
equality and not simply equal equipment 
or facdities; the language of the Fourteenth 
Amendment itself; the debates about its 
adoption; the lustory giving rise to it; and 
contemporaneous debates in the public 
arena about states' rights and about the 
evils of segregation. 
Like the poem, the church, and the 
painting, the opinion can d y  be read as a 
response to its preexisting world, against 
which it is a perfomnce. This meam, in 1 turn, that the meaning of the opinion is, / despite appearances, not essentially propositional but experiential in kind: It is 
&rformance against-a background, and 
understanding the opinion requires 
attunement to hat  background. 
The difficulties of reading a cme in its 
origmal context are greatly increased when 
we try to translate h e  meaning we are 
kgming to understand into the presem, 
and thus inho a world differem not only 
from &at of the case itself, but from any 
' that was then imaped. What does Brown 
mean today! The promise it held out, of an 1 integrated society within a sin@ 
generation, and an end to racial hawed and 
contempt, can now be seen as a hollow 
one. Of course, many &can American 
students do go to integrated schools, and 
to integrated colleges, but it cannot be 
denied that a great many schools are 
effectively segregated, not in the first 
instance by law but by residential patterns. 
Furthermore, there are those who want 
schools that will focus upon Ahcan 
American cuZture, seeking to instin pride 
and disciplinie - a lond of proposed self- 
segregation on  he grwnds of better 
education - which complicates the basic 
premise of B r m ,  that htegration is an 
. inherently pad thing. 
I . . m he question of present meaning that 
probably has the most bite at the moment 
is that of afFimtive action: Is the prcnnise 
of Brown fulfilled merely by forbidding the 
state to segregate by law, or does it require 
- or at least p e d r  - affmtive state 
action to end the partem of m ~ l  
I 
a e  main point remains, 
which is that in both the law 
and the humanities we are 
struggling with problems of 
meaning, of cultural 
difkrence, of the authority 
of different languages\ 
dominance and abuse that have 
characterized American society nearly from 
the beginning?-Or does Brown$ hostility 
toward racial seg-regation support the view 
that the state should be prohibited from 
drawing raclal lines, even those that benefit 
the minority? These are questions Brown 
raises but does not answer; in finding or 
rnalang answers to them, the law will seek 
simultaneously to be true to Brown and, 
of necessity, to give it new meaning in a 
new world. 
When we look back to Brown and ask 
what it means for the present, it is not 
enough, then, for us to try to understand 
this gesture in the context in whch it 
occurred; we must translate it from one 
world to another world, and, in translating, 
change its meaning. 
To generalize quickly from this all too 
brief summary, it is evident that, ljke the 
humanities, the law takes as its subject 
texts or a d c t s  made by others, in other 
cultural circumstances, and in some way in 
the past; that the law is concerned with 
their meaning, in the first instance to the 
lawmakers and the world they addressed, 
in the second instance to "us," that is, the 
present world; that this meaning is 
fundamentally performative and 
experiential in land, inhering in a 
performance against a context; that this 
meaning cannot be reflected without 
distortion in our world and language; that 
its meaning to "usn is therefore a translation 
that entails a transformation, camed on 
under simultaneous and opposed fidelities 
to the origmal and to the world into whch 
it is canied. The readmg of texts in the law 
is thus an art in many ways k the art of 
reading humanistic texts. 
Of course, there is more to say on this 
subject, for the law has its own constraints 
and its own si&icances. But tke most 
notable distinction - the East that it is an 
exerdse of officd power -- does not much 
I 
affect what 1 say, excq,  to make it even I 
more important that the process of thought 
and imagination by which legal texts are 
read be sensible, wise, and good. The main 
point remains, which is that in both the 
law and the humanities we are stru&ing 
with problems of meaning, of cultural ,'I 
difference, of the authority of different j 
languages. One of my deepest beliefs is that ,-, 
to read the. work of a mind engaged wit4 ' ?  
one form of this struggle may help us to . ' 
understand a mind engaged in another, 
and help us confront our own languages, 
uncertainties, and translations as well. As 
lawyers, we have much to learn from the 
efforts of others in other forms; and 
perhaps it works the other way, too - I 
that is, painters, poets, and architects have 
something to learn from\their sister 
discipline, the law. 3 i 
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